Epistemic Unfairness in Barry Hallen’s Account of Agency in Yoruba Moral Epistemology

Abstract

This paper exposes the problem of unfair treatment and discrimination against epistemic agents in knowledge production, knowledge sharing, and consensus practices in Hallen’s account of Yoruba epistemic thought. It does this to contribute to Barry Hallen’s account of Yoruba moral epistemology which it substantiates with some explanations from Fricker’s epistemic agency. The paper contends that understanding epistemic agency is pivotal to exploring the depth of epistemic harm and occlusion latent in Yoruba epistemology. It shows that three kinds of epistemic agencies – human agency, communal agency, and divine agency – which result in structural and cultural epistemic injustice, are identifiable in Yoruba epistemic space. The paper is significant because it shows that there exists an alarming endogenous epistemic injustice in Yoruba thought, which is exogenously complicated by the structural imbalance and institutional hiccup in the distribution, accessibility, and sharing of globally produced knowledge in contemporary Africa.