

The Nature of Threat to Nigeria's Defence Policy in a Fluctuating World Order: A Historical Analysis

Friday Aworawo

Department of History and Strategic Studies
University of Lagos.

Abstract

This article examines the nature and pattern of threats to Nigeria's defence policy since independence. Indeed, the analysis of threats as a foundation for a country's defence policy prognostication is very critical because an erroneous assessment may result to underestimation, overestimation, weak as well as unrealistic strategy to achieve both core and peripheral national interests. Internal and external threats to Nigerian state have been prominent since the 1960. Hence, this article examines the nature and impact of internal and external threats to Nigeria. The essay equally assesses the role of the Nigeria's armed forces to contain the various threats, and concludes with suggestions that to develop a national policy framework that would reduce socio-political and economic instabilities, which makes for threats, are essentially critical. The work also avers that diplomatic relations between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours and the Great Powers is similarly important to tackle threats to Nigeria's interests. These would be the best way to minimize the recurring threats to Nigeria's corporate existence and interests because a "state" is only a "state" when it has the capacity to defend itself against any form of threat.

Introduction

A country's defence policy is usually the bedrock design to address any form of threat, which may serve as impediment to pursue its vital interest. It is therefore not surprising that there was a conscious effort at independence for the development of a very strong defence policy. The defence policy of Nigeria began to emerge in the period shortly before the end of British colonial administration. Indeed in the late 1950s, particularly as independence was becoming a reality, Nigerians began to articulate a defence policy for the newly independence state that would

thwart any form of threat against her interests and the corporate existence of the country. The outcome of the various efforts ultimately culminated in the groundwork of Nigerian defence policy properly so defined in October 1960.

Though, the newly emerged defence policy was in many respects a continuation of the British defence policies framework for her West African colonies. However, the socio-political environment, economic, topography, geo-strategic location, socio-cultural plurality, religion complexity as well as Nigeria's interest and values in the post-independence period have come to influence areas of emphasis in the implementation of the defence policy thrust (Ekoko, 1990:1-6). This article examines the origins, threats and issues associated with the Nigeria's defence policy since independence.

Defence Policy

The term defence policy is widely used by the nonprofessional, generalist and the specialist in strategic studies, but has been rarely defined with any precision despite its apparent simplicity. Most time defence policy is used interchangeably with security. The ambiguity in the definition as Bernard Brodie (1973: 347) rightly notes, stems primarily from the fact that "defence" is a markedly expansible concept: an ideology, which legitimizes a number of crucial trends in the post-World War II order. Closely related to this is the fact that there is a consensus among scholars and experts that defence policy involves much more than a simple statement of how the military forces of a country will be engaged to achieve political objectives, which has accounted for multifaceted definitions of the concept.

Thus, defence policy like most concept in the humanities and social sciences dose not enjoy universally acceptable definition as many experts and scholars have defined the subject based on their intellectual predilection. According to John M. Colins (1970) in his book *Grand Strategy*, designs a strategic matrix which shows the multiplicity of inputs in defence policy such as political, military, economic, social, psychological as well as technological which are manipulated with the assistance of several power variables for a country to achieve its desired defence policy objectives. For Celestine Bassey (2011:3-6) defence policy denotes the general tendencies and principles that underlie the

provision, deployment and the use of military resources to facilitate not only the protection, but also the pursuit of the perceived national interests of the state.

O. A. Akinyeye (1998: 1-3) for its part, defined defence policy as an action pursued or intended to be pursued for the protection of a nation's interests, goals, and values against threat. Giving the aforementioned definitions, a defence policy may therefore be defined as a military strategy or plan employed to contain any threats from both internal and external as well as to safeguard the social, economic, military and political interests and values of any state in the world as a whole.

Nigeria's defence policy essentially therefore focuses on the protecting of its national interests; namely core and peripheral interests. The core interests are those things the country is willing to go to war to defend, which include territorial integrity, political and economic independence as well as the socio-political organisation of the state. While the peripheral interests may include international prestige and cultural values, which the nation believes are worthy to pursue depend on available resources (Akinyeye, 1998: 1-3). Hence scholars and experts in this area are agreed on the fact that a defence policy involves much more than a mere statement of the use of the army to achieve political objectives. This observation notwithstanding, the military is one of the many significant instruments in the orchestra of power, which states use at an appropriate moment in the quest of their respective national interest.

The British/Colonial Antecedent for Nigeria's Defence Policy

The origin of the modern Nigeria's defence policy, can be traced back to the establishment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), by the British during the colonial period to protect all her interests within the region. Even before the 1914 amalgamation, especially from 1898 the colonial master had a defence plan and budgeting (Ekoko, 1990:5). Not surprising therefore that at independence in 1960, the West African Frontier Force eventually became the forerunner of the Nigerian Army. It should be however be stressed that during the negotiations for Nigeria's independence in 1958, the British were said to have predicated the conceding of independence on the signing of a defence pact. This was not considered objectionable by the government of Sir Abubaka Tafawa Balewa, the first Prime Minister of Nigeria. Balewa felt it was only

normal for independent Nigeria to continue as a protégé of Britain, who should continue exercising its colonial responsibility of providing a security shield over Nigeria. Consequently, the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact was signed in 1958 with the proviso for the establishment of a British military base in Nigeria as well as to train Nigerian armed forces officers (Ibid).

The British hoped through the pact to consolidate their political, military and economic influence in Nigeria coupled with the fear that the defunct Soviet Union may want to take advantage of the withdrawal of western European colonial powers to expand its own sphere of influence in Africa as it was doing in Eastern Europe during the Cold War period. In addition, there was the general view that Nigeria had no enemies and would not be confronted by any security situation threats warranting the mobilisation of troops (Vogt, 1900: 79). This threat perception dictated the decision of the Balewa's government to conclude a defence Pact with Britain since only a world power such Britain could muster sufficient force to deal with an intimidation from another world power.

However, despite the seeming good reasons for Balewa's intention, there was much domestic antagonism to the defence pact, chiefly because of the neo-colonial tone of the agreement such that it was abrogated in 1962. In fact, before the abrogation, Nigeria was overflowing with violent protest: the press, trade union, politicians, youth movements, students' union, market women and all vented a barrage of criticism on the pact, calling for its revocation. It must however be noted that despite the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact abrogation, the foreign policy objectives and the attendant defence obligations, which the Federal Government proclaimed in 1960 when the Anglo-defence Pact was in operation remained, and have been enlarged by successive administration till date.

Nigeria's Defence Policy Since the Late 1960s

As a sovereign political entity, Nigeria has the responsibility to protect her national interests; core or vital, strategic and peripheral. The national interests are derived from the shared values, goals and aspirations of her citizenry. To achieve these interests in our ever-changing world order characterized by opportunities, conflict of interests, threats and instability required a well-articulated national defence policy framework with specific objectives for the realization of her national interests.

Consequently, the Federal Government of Nigeria has therefore outlined the following as the country's National Defence Policy structure.

The specific objectives of the country's defence policy as contained in the Nigeria *National Defence Policy* document include; (a) protection of Nigeria's sovereignty, citizens, values, culture, interests, resources and territory against external threats; (b) the provision of defence as well as strategic advice and information to Government; (c) the promotion of security consciousness among Nigerians; (d) response to requests for aid to civil authority; (e) participation in disasters management and humanitarian relief operations both at home and abroad; (f) assistance to government agencies and levels of government in achieving national goals; (g) protection of Nigerians wherever they may reside (h) ensuring security and stability in West Africa sub-region through collective security; (i) participation in bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations and (j) contributing to international peace and security (National Defence Policy, 2006: 22-23). By implication, it can be understood that the Nigerian's defence policy had Africa as its operational theatre and by extension the world. In other words, Nigerian's defence policy thrust is tailored along the country's Afro-centric and global interests.

With less than two decades into the fourth republic, section 217 (2) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, recognises the Armed Forces as instrument of coercion within her border to be used against internal or external threats. The constitution encapsulates the essence and the roles of the Armed Forces as follow: defending Nigeria from external aggression, maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air, suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called up on to do so by the president...and performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999: 156-157).

Thus among other things, the armed forces has the primary responsibility to protect and defend the country against any form of threats. In view of the complex nature of the internal and external threats, which Nigeria's defence policy is expected to address, the constitution empowers the president who is also the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), to provide defence policy direction with the cooperation of the National Security

Council and the National Defence Council for the defence policy direction. Usually, it is the C-in-C who delegates authority through the Minister of Defence to the Chief of Defence Staff and the Service Chief for the deployment of the armed forces (National Defence Policy, 2006:21). Hence the implementation of the defence policy is a combination of the civilian technocrats and the personnel of the armed forces. Since independence, the country defence policy has been to protect its national interests which are very diverse especially in world that is characterised by conflict of interests and objectives (Azazi, 2011: 91-97).

No doubt, Nigeria's immense potential of socio-economic and human capital is enviable in the world. It has a large market of over 150 million people according to the 2007 census, the largest economy in Africa, a large reservoir of crude oil and one of the largest military establishment in Africa, just to mention but a few.

All these have put Nigeria in an enviable regional and continental leadership position in Africa as well as among the comity of nations, which she has also used for the support of its Afro-centric and global policies. On the other hand, these wide-ranging potentials and interests have also been subjected to various degrees of internal and external threats over the years. In fact, some of these threats had even threatened the very existence of the Nigeria state. It is against this background that the next section examines some major internal and external threats to Nigerian's national interests as well as how the armed forces; the Army, Navy, Air force have been able to safeguard and protect the country.

Dynamics of Internal Threats to Nigeria's National Interests

It is controvertible fact that threat of any form is a key factor, which tremendously influenced the formulation of defence policies of states. Threats, has been defined defined, as the characterisation by the absence of freedom, lack of safety, absence of people's rights and the loss of lives. It may also be described as an act that composes of danger to any entity. Since the most fundamental value for state is the ability to maintain and protect its identity usually landmass, population and ethnic composition, whatever will disturb its stability is therefore regarded as threats that must be dealt with by any means necessary. In fact, a state is only a state when it has the capacity to defend itself. Thus a country defence policy is

designed to ensure the use of power and influence to guarantee national survival and well-being based on national values. Nigerian defence policy is therefore, designed to thwart all forms of threats that are contrary to the well-being of the country.

Internal threat to Nigeria, just like other country of the world, resides within the nation's border. And from the opening years of independence internal threats have constitute danger to the country's core interests of preserving its territorial integrity. In fact, there is a consensus among strategic experts and analysts that the most potent threats to the Nigerian state are the internal threats. The foremost internal threat to which the nation was confronted with was the instability that resulted from the political upheaval that characterized the period between 1962 and 1965- the western region crisis, the Tiv riots and the Twelve Day Revolt led by Adaka Isaac Boro for Niger-Delta and other civil unrest/insurgency rife during the first twenty nine years of independence (Vogt, 1981: 77).

Particularly, the politics of bitterness during the first republic brought a lot of intractable instability to the country and it took active intervention of the police 'action' before a measure of order was restored. The collapsed of the first republic set in motion chains of events, which have continued to form parts of internal threats that plague Nigeria four decades after. By 1967 a major ethnic conflict led to a full scale civil war, which threatened the very survival and self-preservation of Nigeria. All the armed forces were mobilised because the very existence of the country was at stake. The civil war experience demonstrates that an adequate defence policy was required not only to counter external aggression but also to thwart internal insurgencies and deter irredentist aspiration and secessionist ambition of some Nigerian sub-nationalities. The civil war lessons were the primary reason for the expansion and phenomenal increased of the Nigerian Armed Forces in all totality so as to cope and arrest all form of internal threats afterward.

Also added to this list of internal threats is religious intolerance and extremism. Incidents of religious extremism have manifested in a number of occasion. Religious fundamentalism of the Maitatsine Sect was a major threat to internal security following the mass indiscriminate attacks on innocent people and public institutions by its members in Kano, Yola, Kaduna and Bauchi sporadically from 1980 to 1984 (Ibid). These attacks

could not be stop by the police until extensive military intervention into the crisis. There was also the issue of Nigerian membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conferences, which led to a fresh outburst of uprising in Kaduna State in 1987. Other religious related internal threats include; the Kano ‘anti’ American war in Afghanistan in 2001, the Sharia code conflict of 18th June 2001, the anti-Miss World religious crisis in almost all the states in the northern Nigeria in 2002 and the religious crisis of Jos in 2008 (Adekanye, 1993).

A more recent and still ongoing dangerous religious related crisis, which has seriously threatened the very existence of the Nigerian state is the Islamic Boko Haram Sect which has for the first time in the history of religious conflict in Nigeria, introduced suicide bombing among its various strategy of destruction and destabilisation of the country for the sole aim of attempting to establish Islamic Nigeria. In fact, the ongoing Boko Haram crisis has made the entire northern parts of the country still unsafe, despite the country’s attempt to stop the conflict since 2009. The situation has even compelled the Federal Government to initially declare state of emergency in about 13 local government areas in some states in the northeast of the country in 2012 and a full emergence rule declared in Borno, Bauchi and Adamawa since 14th July, 2013. An estimate of over 4000 Nigerians and foreigners have lost their lives due to this crisis.

Communal clashes have equally form parts of internal threats to the Nigerian state. Instances abound, such as the conflict between Ife and Modakeke area of Osun State in 2000/2001, the communal conflict of Sagamu and other parts of Ogun State between 1999/2000 (Mammam, 2011). This is also true of the Plateau State where several lives and properties worth billions of Naira were lost.

The emergence of micro-nationalism has also added and heightened the level of internal threats to the country’s national interests. Ethnic nationalism related movement such as MASSOP, OPC and in the Niger-Delta all have constitutes major internal threats since 1999. Also to be added to the list of internal threats is military coups which have contributed to internal instability since the two coups of 1966 as well as the abortive coup of 1990 which amid at disintegrating the country were essentially over the fear of ethnic domination. Commenting on this, T. Y. Danjuma (1989) stated thus:

The forces own internal problems and rivalries could easily be transformed into national security problems. For instance over the past ten years, we have had to contend with coups and threats of coups as a result of officers wishing to enhance or accelerate their promotion.

T. A. Imobighe (1990: 223-228) also corroborated the above verdict thus:

Nowadays, every military officer wants a public post in preference to normal military appointment. You find Captains lobbying to be appointed to head environmental task force, every Major considers himself a potential governor. Of course, such crave for public office by the military personnel generates inordinate ambition... cannot but pose security problems to the nations.

The analysis demonstrates that internal squabbles within the army have also constituted major threats to Nigeria's national interests. Hence, the potential threats are political and religious intolerance, internal subversion, fear of ethnic domination, coup d'état, civil unrest/revolutionary insurgency all have served as agents of destabilisation. These threats have continued to plague the Nigeria's state since independence.

The fact that there are still more agitation from the various nations to which Nigeria is made up for the convening of a sovereign national conference as a strategy to overcome possible threats to national interests as well as the formula for rotational presidency, the demand for the creation of equal states for the six geo-political zones, coupled with the call for true federalism suggests that internal threats are the real challenge to the existence of Nigeria.

External Threats to Nigeria's National Interests

Just like internal threats, external threats have also contributed to the sources of instability to the Nigerian states. Though, this is contrary to the belief of some First Republic politicians that Nigeria had no enemies, and therefore as long as we decided to avoid participation in military bloc

formation and committed to strict non-alignment, we had nothing to fear from the rest of the international community. More so was that there are no large conventional military threats facing Nigeria from its immediate borders.

While all these may be correct on the surface, the reality is that Nigeria's aspiration for continental leadership, her support for different liberation movements as well as its commitment to support the back race across the world have made her incur the wrath of external threats to her national interests. In fact, less than two decades from independence, the country was confronted with a lot of external threats. The first major external threat came through the Nigerian Civil War, which broke out in 1967. Though it was a war within, but the huge supports given to the Biafra from countries within and outside Africa revealed for the first time that there are many countries that do not want the cooperative existence of Nigeria.

The international dimension to the civil war witnessed the alignment of some key allies of Nigeria in support of the secessionist cause of the Biafra. The first surprise came from Britain, a former partner in defence pact and a co-participant in the Commonwealth of Nations, refused to deliver some weapons and equipment, which Nigeria had earlier paid for, for the fear that this might escalate the civil war. This was in spite of the fact that the rebels were getting weapons from within and outside the continent. Although Britain and the United States though did not recognise the rebels, they nevertheless accepted the image of genocide, which was painted against Nigeria.

The role of France in the Nigerian Civil War was even more frightening. France, under Charles De Gaulle, provided considerable economic, military, diplomatic and other means of assistance to the secessionist in all ramifications. The French government mobilised a good number of her former colonies in support for the rebels for the balkanisation and the destabilisation of Nigeria. France and some of her former colonies such as Ivory Coast, Gabon and some African key states like Tanzania, for instance, gave official recognition and direct support for the rebels.

Commenting on the reasons for the supports for the rebel, M. A. Vogt (1990: 79) stated thus:

France supported the rebel because it was believed that a balkanised Nigeria would provide greater stability of the African Sub-region. The French later insisted that the smaller French-speaking African economies faced the danger of domination by the giant Nigerian economy. At the same time she was consolidating her military presence in Africa through a variety of defence pact and assistance to the independence African states. France saw in the Nigerian Civil War an opportunity to expand her sphere of influence to include a potentially oil-rich part of the former British Empire.

The analysis above goes further to show that Nigeria huge economic potential as well as leadership aspiration, which were a direct threats to France interests, earned her obvious jealousy from France who see the civil war as an avenue to destabilised the country. As it should also be remembered that Nigeria had in 1960 led African opposition to French nuclear test in the Sahara and as matter of fact, broke diplomatic relation with France over the issue. The civil war therefore provided the French the opportunity to reduce what was considered Nigeria's threats for good and to gain a foothold in the oil-rich African enclave if the secessionist proved successful.

Little wonder therefore, that Nigeria's external threats perception emanating from France involvement in African Affairs and especially her military presence in many francophone countries which are Nigeria's neighbours, coupled with the French search for an expanded influence even in countries that are not traditional francophone such as Equatorial Guinea, but contiguous to Nigeria has led to the call by prominent Nigerian and African scholars such as Bolaji Akinyemi (1972: 23) to argue that Nigeria's defence policy posture must be developed to such an extent that we must be able to confront the French force for force. Ali Mazrui also shares the above sentiments when he suggested that Nigeria's should even develop a "black bomb" to curb the French extremism in Africa (Muzrui, 1980). African countries such as Ivory Coast and Gabon under the leadership of Houphouet Biogny and Bongo were the French allies that provided the delivery channels support for the Biafra.

South Africa contributions to the civil war during this period also reveal how the apartheid regime was committed to destabilisation of Nigeria. In fact in the mid-1969, report had it that between twenty-five and fifty tons of arms were shipped weekly from South Africa for the support for the rebel. Therefore, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Gabon not only granted official recognition to the rebel but equally carried out extensive campaign for Biafra in France and francophone Africa contrary to the stipulation of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of member states in the OAU Chartered.

Clashes between and among contiguous states to Nigeria northeast borders such as Cameroun, Chad and Niger have also constituted major threats to the sovereignty of Nigeria. Internal crisis of Chad during the 1980s brought a lot of refugees to Nigeria which made the northern parts of the country very volatile. The result was Nigeria's intervention to contain spill-over effect. The Bakassi Peninsula crisis between Nigeria and Cameroun, which resulted in open confrontation with the losses of men and material especially during General Abacha regime (1993-1998), was a source of threats to our national interests. More so that France made it very clear that it would extend military assistance to Cameroun should in case Nigeria decided to go on a full-scale war (Agwu, 2009:315-340). Happily though excruciating, the intervention and the verdict of the World Court, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 2002, laid the foundation for the peaceful resolution of the crisis, it nevertheless demonstrates that Nigeria's immediate neighbours are real and potential external threats to our national interests.

Potential external threats still exist for Nigeria arising primarily from unresolved issues in her extensive and largely un-demarcated borders with the four contiguous countries of Benin Republic, Niger, Chad and Cameroun which collectively total about 49000Km. These borders have also served as a gateway to foreign militias as most of the suicide bombers of the Islamic Boko Haram Sect are recruited from Chad and Niger. Unless and until these borders are properly defined, demarcated and protected, Nigeria will continue to experience border violation and spill-over effects of conflict, which form additional external threats to the country. More so that these states are former French colonies, which France is willing to exploit to the detriment Nigeria's national interests.

The Gulf of Guinea, which host a lot of Nigeria's economic and strategic interest has added to the sources of external threats because the region has become very important strategic calculations of the world powers in view of the rich oil and gas reserves in the area. Based on the treaty establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission, eight African States namely Angola, Cameroun, Congo, Congo DRC, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and Nigeria all have different interests within the geographical area. Consequently competition among these states over maritime and strategic issues as well as criminal activities form parts of external threats to all involved and Nigeria is not immune.

Particularly noteworthy is that during zenith of the Niger Delta insurgency, the militancy gunrunner Mr. Henry Okah was reported to have shipped guns into the country for the various militant groups through the Gulf of Guinea channel. And it took the cooperation between Nigeria located in West Africa and Angola in faraway Southern Africa before Mr. Okah could be arrested. This clearly explained the security implication of the Gulf of Guinea to Nigeria.

Extra African interests in the area have equally constitutes external threats to Nigeria too. Since the late 1990 and particularly after the tragic September 11, 2001, there has been resurgence of the United States global strategic interests in the Gulf of Guinea. Central to this is the rising profile of the West's energy security calculations both as a source of increased, steady supply of oil and of profit for the Western oil majors. The point that the region currently provides 15% of US oil import and rising to 25% by 2020 would generates competition between US as well as other great powers such as Britain, France, China including India whose oil import has been rapidly expanded (Tukur, 2010:217-223).

This clearly shows that the Gulf of Guinea has become very important in the strategic calculations of the world powers in view of the rich oil and gas reserves in the area. The possibility of open confrontation in the future, between Nigeria and some powerful nations desperate for vast resources of the region cannot be rule out. The scramble for the region has therefore constituted formidable external threats to Nigeria's national interests.

The fact that some member states of the Gulf of Guinea Commission such as Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe have allowed American naval bases in their territories, and Nigeria seeking the establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Guard Force (GGGF) with logistic and training from the United States reveals Nigeria's national interests vulnerability to external threats from the region (Eze, 2010:229-288).

An assessment of the above goes on to illustrate that Nigeria's external threats could be categorised into two; namely threats from the continent and extra continental threats. The continental threats had been those emanating from jealousies from other African States which had been discussed to include; ideological difference, refugee problems, as well as inherited unstable borders with a numbers of francophone countries. On the other hand, the extra continental threats have been imperialistic and neo-colonial intention of the great powers as well the competing for Nigeria's strategic interests among the developed countries. While most of the external threats to Nigeria's national interest have been addressed, phenomenally through peaceful relations with other states, there are a numbers of others, which only moderate successes have been recorded. It is against this background that most Nigerians scholars agreed that the internal threats assumed the important threats against our national interests.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that Nigeria's defence policy formulation is predicated on a realistic of threats against our national interest's objectives. The defence policy is therefore design to enhance national's capability to protect the core national interests in all ramification through the deployment of the armed forces when necessary as well as other resources of the state. Since the preservation of the country's territorial integrity and corporate existence is our core interests, which is mostly threatened by internal threats and, often explore by external forces to destabilise the country, it is therefore expedient to develop a national policy framework that would reduce socio-political and economic instabilities that makes for internal sources of threats as opposed to too much budget for the armed forces, which had been the major focus since independence. This is very crucial because the civil war experience, the numerous ethno-religious conflict such as the Maitatsine Movement and the ongoing Boko Haram sects threats as well as the Niger-Delta crisis to

mention but a few have exposed the vulnerability of the Nigeria and the impotent of the security agencies strategies in addressing internal threats.

The fact that only the Niger-Delta crises almost cripple the country's 90% total income in 2010 despite the full mobilisation of the armed forces calls to urgency not only to address internal threats but also to diversify the economy for additional success of income for national development. With reference to external threats, no doubt that Nigeria's commitment toward its Afro-centric policy since independence has been helpful. The country's continental security role through peace-keeping is noteworthy. The nation's decisive opposing to unconstitutional regime as was in the case of Togo, Liberia and Ivory Coast are strategies to thwart external threats. Paying adequate attention to our contiguous states would also help to address the French threats to Nigeria. But particularly remarkable was Nigeria's intervention and the restoration of the elected democratic president in Sao Tome and Principe under Olusegun Obasanjo as a way to secure the nation's Gulf of Guinea interests is a good strategy to thwart external threats from this region which has form a strategic interests of the great powers coupled with diplomatic relations with the great powers.

References

- Adekanye, B. (1993) "Military Operations and Social Stratification" *Inaugural Lecture*, University of Ibadan.
- Agwu, F. (2009) *National Interest, International Law and Our Destiny*. Lagos: Spectrum Books Limited.
- Akinyemi, A.B. (1972) "Confrontation and Dialogue: Essence of a leading Role for Nigeria." *Venture* 24,1.
- Akinyeye, O.A. (1998) "Issues in Nigerian Defence Policy in A Changing World Order." *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs* 24, 1.
- Azazi, O.A. (2011) "National Security and Defence." In Celestine Oyom Bassey and Charles Quarker Dokubo (eds.) *Defence Policy in Nigeria: Capability and Context*. Washington: Authorhouse.
- Bassey, C. (1987) "Nigeria's Defence Policy in a future Continental Order." In *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, 13, 1.
- Bassey, C. (1990) *The Military Instrument and Strategic Policy in a Democratic Order: A Theoretical Reconsideration of some*

- unresolved Issues Concerning Nigeria.” In *The Journal of Political Science*, xiii, 1 & 2.
- Bassey, C. (2011) “*Defence Policy Discourse.*” in Celestine Oyom Bassey and Charles Quarker Dokubo (eds.) *Defence Policy in Nigeria: Capability and Context*. Washington: Authorhouse.
- Brodie, B. (1973) *War and Politics*. New York: Macmillan.
- Clayton, N. (1991) *The Framework of Operational Warfare*. London: Routledge.
- Danjuma, T. Y.N. (1979) “Nigeria’s Security in the 1980s,” Lecture at NIPSS, 30 September.
- Ekoko, A. E. (1990) “The Historical and Socio-Political Environment of Nigerian Defence Policy.” In A.E. Ekoko and M.A. Vogt (eds.) *Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems*. Lagos: Malthouse.
- Eze, A. (2010) “ The Gulf of Guinea and the Challenges Ahead” in Osita, C. Chike, A. and Charles Q. (eds.) *Nigeria’s Security Interest in Africa*. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
- Imobighe, T. I. (1994). “Doctrine for and Threats to Internal Security.” In A. E. Ekoko and M. A. Vogt (eds.) *Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems*. Lagos: Malthouse.
- Mammam, T. (2011) “The Role of Border Communities and Security Forces in the Management of Security in Border areas in the North East” in Bassey Ate and Bola Akinterinwa (eds.) *Cross-Border, Armed Banditry in the North East*. Lagos: NIIA.
- Muzrui, A. (1980) “Africa’s Nuclear Weapons,” Lecture delivered at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
- Nigerian National Defence Policy, 2006.
- The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*, 1999.
- Tukur, H. A. (2010) “Security Framework For The Gulf Of Guinea.” in Osita, C. Chike, A. and Charles Q. (eds.) *Nigeria’s Security Interest in Africa*. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
- Vogt, M.A. (1981). “Nigeria’s Defence: An Assessment.” *Nigerian Forum*, 1, 2, April.